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Abstract. Corruption is universally considered as an undesirable characteristic
of public services. But despite attempts to simplify and automate such services,
there is very little prior work to detect, handle or prevent corruption in computa-
tion literature. This is particularly surprising given the significant advances made
in detecting fraud, a relevant but different form of public impropriety afflicting
businesses. In this paper, we paint a vision of how information and communi-
cations technology (ICT), and specifically agent-based methods, can help tackle
corruption in public services and identify challenges to achieve the vision.
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1 Introduction
Corruption afflicts both public [4,5] and private [8] services world wide. In this pa-
per, we follow the definition by the World Bank and the United Nations Development
Program (UNDP) [17], which have defined corruption as the ”misuse or the abuse of
public office for private gain” [10]. The manifestation of misuse can occur in many
ways, such as bribery, extortions, kickbacks, vendetta, and more. The notion of cor-
ruption bears many facets, from ethical to economical [18,4]. It is known that it has a
significant negative impact on the growth of economies and hence, is universally con-
sidered undesirable[13]. A popular definition of corruption is Corruption = Monopoly
+ Discretion - Accountability[7].
However, little is known about corruption in a computational sense making even
detecting it hard let alone preventing or addressing it. Consider the questions:
– exchange of money: can a service for which the customer does not pay a fee (free
service) be termed corrupt? Or conversely, can a corrupt practice only happen if the
customer pays for a service?
– human agents: can a service be corrupt if the agent delivering the service is not a
human but an automated agent?
– contention for resources: can corruption happen if delivering it requires no con-
tention of resources? Alternatively, if resources are scarce, will an objective way of
allocating them help remove corruption?
– unique request: can a service be corrupt if it is one-of-a-kind and hence only re-
quested once?
– familiarity between service requester and provider: if a service’s requester and
provider are known, does it definitely promote corruption? Conversely, if service
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requester or provider is anonymized, will this promote or reduce corruption? If mul-
tiple service requesters are known to each other or different actors while delivering
services, can this help reduce corruption?
– accountability: if a service request was found to be handled in a corrupt manner,
can the culpability of agents involved or service requesters be established legally?
What traceability mechanisms reduce and what can promote corruption?
– brokers: does allowing brokers to mediate service requests on behalf of service
requesters promote corruption?
Specifically, what are the ingredients necessary for a service to be corrupt? If these
were known, they can be checked for easy corruption detection and even prevention.
What are the features in a service process design that promote corruption? If these were
known, services could be better re-designed to address them. What are the agent behav-
iors (requester or service provider) that incentivize corruption? If these were known, the
agents could be made more aware. What are the patterns of corruption and prescriptions
on how they may be addressed? If one considers popular attempts to address corruption,
automation and transparency via open data are frequently mentioned[12]. Why do they
help and what more could be done?
The goal of this paper is draw attention of the AI and Agent community to the
opportunities in making significant breakthroughs to tackle corruption by using and
enhancing their techniques. We next present an illustrative example and then paint a
vision of less corruptible public processes. We then identify challenges on the path to
achieve it using agent technologies and conclude with a discussion.
A term often used for imprompriety in business is fraud which is different from
corruption. Phua et al give a comprehensive survey of fraud detection techniques in [9]
by considering fraud as the abuse of a profit organization’s system without necessarily
leading to direct consequences. The authors provide a heirarchy of fraud perpetrators
from internal and external perspective of a firm and describe various data mining ap-
proaches in literature to detect them. Note that fraud has a direct monetary aspect which
corruption does not and further, the victim of fraud may be an organization while that
of corruption is usually the service requester. Consequently, fraud is reported and inves-
tigated by organizations who spend extensive resources to tackle them while corruption
is reported by individual service requesters to which organizations respond to.
2 Motivating Example
Our motivating example is the national registration and indentity verification public
process prevalent in almost all countries. This process leads to issuance of a document
(e.g., identity card, passport) without which, a person cannot request some or all of the
following common trasactions: purchase or own property, own a mobile phone, open
a bank account, access higher education, get employment, get subsidy entitlements or
exercise the right to vote. We illustrate with select examples of particular registrations
in three countries - Kenya (national identification), USA (social security) and India
(Aadhar card)1.
1 Note that a country may have multiple registration schemes covering eligibility of different
services. So the examples for the 3 countries are not exclusive.
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Fig. 1. Identity Verification process in Kenya
The National identification (ID) card is the main form of identity document in Kenya
for anyone above the age of 18. It is also the primary document to prove citizenship and
is used to access many public services. The process of registration for the National
ID card begins by applying at a division office anywhere in the country with a proof of
birth, citizenship and residence. In each category, there is a list of acceptable documents.
Interestingly, each category allows a signed attestation by a high-level official to be
acceptable as well. Once the documents are found in order, further forms are submitted
by the applicant. During the process, finger prints are taken and the documents are
validated. Thereafter, an identity card is created and sent to the applicant.
The process is characterized by extremely wide discretion given to registration of-
ficers in determining validity of documents. Specifically, the decision node, 3 - vetting,
and the activity, 13 - verify identity, are discretionary with no clear mechanism on how
to accomplish them but in contrast, the checks for documents having been submitted are
objective. There is no specification for service cost and time, and there is no escalation
mechanism. This, combined with the importance of ID card, leaves room for abuse,
arbitrariness and unreasonable demands on the applicants.
Now consider the national registration processes in USA, called social security (SS)
[15], which entitles and identifies citizens and non-citizens while taking government
services. Here, a clear list of documents proving US citizenship or legal residence for
non-citizens, age and identity is listed. There is little room for discretion because no
category allows a signed attestation by a high-level official to be acceptable - something
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allowed in Kenya. The cost and time limits for the service are prescribed. The process,
however, can only be handled by a single agency creating a monopoly.
Now conside the case of Aadhar card in [16] introduced recently to uniquely iden-
tify a person using bio-metrics like finger prints for the purpose of delivering govern-
ment’s social services. To apply for this card, 18 Proofs of Identity (PoI) and 33 Proofs
of Address (PoA) documents are permitted. The process also allows discretion by al-
lowing attested documents from high-level officials. The cost and time limits for the
service are prescribed. The process, however, can only be handled by a single agency
creating a monopoly. The federal government seeks to make all public services acces-
sible contingent on a person having an Aadhar card. Such a change can increase the
card’s importance but combined with wide official discretion, can have consequences
on corruption. This controversial move is being legally challenged in courts.
Countries and citizens of these and other nations may be interested to know which
national identification processes are prone to corruption, to what degree and why. They
may also want to take corrective actions at design stage by re-designing the processes,
at implementation stage by accounting for the issues in computation-based service de-
livery workflows, at operations stage by defining redressal mechanisms or at periodic
review stage. They would also want to learn from each other’s experiences and incor-
porate to improve their processes.
Apart from this process class, the corruption issue generalizes to all public pro-
cesses. Hence a significant challenge.
3 Vision for Achieving Less Corruptible Public Processes
We now paint a vision of how public processes may be made less corruptible in future
using information and computing technologies (ICT) in general and agent techniques
in particular. We see this as an evolution of progress.
Stage 1: Identify corruptible behavior
The starting point for tackling corruption computationally is to have the ability to
detect it unambiguously. The UNDP definition of corruption (i.e., abuse or misuse ...)
is not helpful since it is hard to detect whether an agent is making private gain while
delivering a service.
The known mechanisms for detecting corruption are non- computational - a) survey
based, where public opinion surveys is used to measure the perceived corruption or
b) institutional diagnostics such as audits and anti-corruption policy conformance of a
public institution[1]. The drawback of survey is that they are subjective and prone to
human bias while institutional diagnostics only assess the administrative loop holes and
do not take care of scenarios where beneficiaries collude in corrupt practices.
A more pragmatic and computational approach was first suggested in [11]) and will
be discussed in next section where a process is deemed suspicious (possibly corrupt) if
given two same or similar service requests (inputs), they lead to different outcomes and
hence outputs (functionally or non-functionally). The assumption is that corruption-
free processes are unbiased, and in unbiased processes, similar inputs should lead to
the similar outcomes in terms of their results (functional outputs) and also the time and
resources incurred to get those results (non-fuctional outputs).
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If one reaches stage 1 and can detect corruption, one will also like to be able to
compare it across different processes. To illustrate, in the running example with na-
tional processes of three different countries, which instance is more corruptible, Social
Security in US or National ID in Kenya? Further, what specifically is the reason for the
process being corruptible ?
Stage 2: Build corruption patterns
There is a large body of work on corruption in social sciences[7], [2]. From this,
some root causes of corruption have been documented [11] . A few are: actors being in
a position of monopoly, service providers not having service level agreements (SLAs)
within which to respond, actors having discretion to take decisions without giving rea-
sons, processes not having mechanisms to review an actor’s decisions and the requester
not having visibility to their request status or provider’s updates.
One would want to use the corruption detection models of stage 1 and build patterns
of corruption root causes through which an agent can unambiguously detect corruptible
service request instances and their likely root causes. Over time, one can also record
what methods actually worked to tackle which root causes so that suitable decision-
support can be built (see next stage).
Stage 3: Recommend corruption reducing measures
In terms of tackling corruption, there is a belief that if processes were automated
or more data about service delivery would be made available[12] or processes were re-
designed, this would help help tackle corruption in public services. But why do these
approaches seem to work? For example, as observed in [14,11], automation requires
formalization of input data requirements and specification of outputs. It is possible that
the precise specification of inputs and outputs, which removes discretion, is the actual
reason for perceived reduction in corruption due to automation. Similary, open data
brings more information about service outcomes into public domain and thus allows
faster detection of corruption. Process re-design may help reduce corruption by remov-
ing unnecessary complexities and promoting traceability. There may be more methods
to control corruption and reasons why they work.
So, if there is a corruption cause seen in a process, what measure should one use for
that particular process type? Further, what is the least change needed in the corruption-
prone processes or service delivering organizations to prevent corruption?
We believe that there is an opportunity to build decision support to help make pro-
cesses less corruptible.
Stage 4: Prevent corruptible processes
The eventual success in tackling corruption will be when corruptible processes are
prevented from getting executed. To do so, corruptible behavior should be detected
when the process is getting designed and flagged. If they are still pursued, measures
should get introduced in their implementation and operation that initiates actions (e.g.,
automatic reporting of suspect behavior) when requests go against uncorrupt baseline.
Eliminating corruption will remain hard as long as detecting private gains of actors
goes undetected. However, to the extent observable behavior of public processes are
formalized, suspicious behaviors can be detected and tackled.
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4 A Formal Vocabulary for Corruption and Its Detection
We demonstrate the first step of the corruption-free vision in this section. Given the cor-
ruption scenarios in the motivating example, we need a vocabulary that enables a com-
putational analysis of corruption-prone process models as well as process instances. For
this, we use the ANIT I meta-model [11] (see Figure 2). Here, nodes represent con-
cepts, edges represent relationships and edges with circled ends denote generalization
relationships.
Fig. 2. ANIT I process meta-model for corruption.
So, a process activity can specialize as a decision or a task. Each activity of a process
is requested by an entity and is provided by another. The requester and the owners could
be individuals or organizations. A task takes many inputs, produces many outputs, and
may have an escalation process associated with it that can be triggered by the requester.
A process also maybe instantiated many times, each instance capturing the execution
trace along with the time and cost of execution for each activity.
We now show how the meta-model can be used to distinguish corrupt process in-
stances from uncorrupt ones. See [11] on how this meta-model is operationalized as
a first-order predicate language, used to define corruption patterns (i.e., monopoly, no
SLA, discretion, lack of reviewability and lack of visibility) and then applied for detect-
ing them based on the functional and non-functional characteristics of process models
and instances.
4.1 Detecting Corruption with ANIT I
Suppose we have a process P ∈ P, whose instance i ∈ IP , when executed with service
request (input data) oin leads to a result oout (output data). We define provenance∗
(oin, oout) as the transitive closure of provenance to denote the input and output of an
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instance. Similarly, let executionTimeOf∗ (i, t) and executionCostOf∗ (i, c) be the time
and costs of i derived from the time and cost of individual activities in i (e.g., as a sum
of time and sum of cost).
Not all instances of P witness corruption. Suppose that i1 ∈ IP has been uncor-
rupted while i2 ∈ IP has been corrupted. Given identical inputs, the outputs of an
uncorrupt process may differ from those of a corrupt one. For i1 and i2 to be compa-
rable, they need to have identical inputs. In many cases, this may not be feasible since
once an input (e.g., service request for a driver license) has been processed, the same
input cannot be processed again for legal reasons. In those cases, we assume that the
inputs are approximately same, i.e., similar, denoted by ≈.
Now considering provenance∗ (in1, out1) for instance i1 and provenance∗ (in2,
out2) for instance i2, one can compare out1 and out2 with the aim to detect corrup-
tion.
– out1 and out2 are the same, but out2 was obtained in much faster time than out1.
Hence, executionTimeOf∗ (i1, t1), execution TimeOf∗ (i2, t2), and t2 ≪ t1.
– out1 and out2 are the same, but out2 was obtained by expending different resources
than out1. Hence, executionCostOf∗ (i1, c1), executionCostOf∗ (i2, c2), and c1 6= c2.
Here, the cost could be more or it could be less for the corrupt instance depending
on who bears most of the cost. If the requester bears the most of it, corrupt instances
would observe less costs and the converse is true if the provider bears it.
– out1 and out2 are different. This means that even though the same inputs were
given, the results were different. It indicates that (a) some decision (by an actor)
was not consistently taken, or (b) some data was not considered by a processing
step.
4.2 Discussion
In above, a process is deemed suspicious (possibly corrupt) if given two same or similar
service requests (inputs), they lead to different outcomes and hence outputs (function-
ally or non-functionally). It makes the assumption that corruption-free processes are
unbiased, and in unbiased processes, similar inputs should lead to the similar outcomes
in terms of their results (functional outputs) and also the time and resources incurred to
get those results (non-fuctional outputs).
The benefit of this approach is that detecting variance in outputs is computationally
easier than discovering an agent’s suspicous gains. However, this definition will not
work if the the service request is unique because there is not enough data to compare.
To aid such a computable detection of corruption, governments should:
– Make raw and aggregate data about service requests publicly available. In doing so,
they should anonymize sensistive or personally identifiable information which are
irrelevant to the output of the service requests.
– Setup baseline for performance and monitor performance data on service requests
for aberrations. The aberrations are candidates for corruption.
– Use historical data on service performance to re-visit baselines periodically over
time, alter processes steps or change actors.
– define a transparent process to tackle unique service requests so that they can be
later audited.
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5 Technical Challenges to Achieve Vision
We now look at some of the technical challenges which can help achieve the vision of
less-corruptible public processes.
1. Formalizing Process Models for Corruption Analysis
In order to represent and reason with public proceeses, we need a vocabulary of the
key concepts in the corruption domain. Business process languages like BPMN[3] can
serve as a starting point but needs to be extended. Here, there is work on patterns and
anti-patterns for capturing desirable service attributes[6]. However, this has not been
applied for detecting corruption in public services.
The importance of a formal model for corruption has long been felt but there is
very little work. One example we are aware of is [5] which presents a model to connect
informal and formal credit markets. Another work is seen in [11] where a meta-model
for corruption is formalized using a first-order predicate languageANIT I. Compared
with generic business process that capture activities, actors, inputs and outputs, execu-
tion time and costs, the meta-model additionally captures escalation paths, data prove-
nance, actor inter-relationship and task visibility.
2. Simulating processes
Agent-based simulation is a flourishing discipline studying emergent behavior of
large scale systems. Public processes offer an attractive application area to study service
request, the corresponding service provider behavior, agent incentives and long-term
process characteristics.
Further, insights of agent societies will help understand how corruption spreads over
time and with more processes becoming corruptible.
3. Agent Reasoning
Given that actors may have varying degree of discretion in public processes, plan-
ning and reasoning for the service requester and service provider become even more
complex. As additional challenge, one would like to know if multiple actors could col-
lude to abuse their positions to corrupt the process. This can happen among actors in
service providers, among different service requesters or even across them.
Agents cooperating with each other can also help in removing discretion and hence
corruption. Some examples are transparent decision making techniques like voting pro-
tocols, auctions and negotiations. Another challenge will be to introduce such tech-
niques during process design with minimal change(s).
4. Agent Economics
Since at the heart of corruption is an actor’s desire to make unreasonable gain (which
may or may not be observable), modeling incentives of individuals and the society at
large will be challenging. Further, knowing the rewards of corrupt practice and the risk
of punishment, incentives and disincentives of the actors at key decision points need
exploration.
5: Human and Agent Interaction
Since public processes are essentially human centered, using agent techniques bring
challenges in human agent interaction into focus. Agents can analyze interactions of
human actors to learn relationships (like cartelling or conflict-of-interest). Agents can
also interact with humans to alert them on potential instaces of corruption or advise
remedial actions.
Tackling Corruption With Agents & ICT: A Vision 9
6: System Traceability
A general challenge for improving process transparency is to provide traceability
information for process instances executed. This becomes quite challenging if sub-parts
of the process flow are outsourced to other organizations. Further, if an instance is found
suspicious, we need an ability to pin-point to likely causes using established service
baselines.
6 Discussion
In this section, we will illustrate that even initial steps to formalize public processes
can lead to better understanding of corruption. We revisit the questions raised about
corruption earlier and try to answer them using ANIT I [11].
– Can a service for which the customer does not pay a fee (free service) be corrupt-
ible? Answer: The service can still be corrupt because, given similar input, their
execution times may be different or even their service outcome may be different.
– Can a service be corrupt if the agent is not a human? Answer: The service can be
corrupt since nature of the agent has no relevance to difference in outcome of two
similar service requests.
– Can corruption happen if delivering a service requires no contention of resources?
Answer: The service can be corrupt since availability of resources is irrelevant to
the cost, time or results of two similar service requests.
– Can a service be corrupt if it is one-of-a-kind and hence only requested once? An-
swer: TheANIT I model only detects corruption by comparing outcomes of sim-
ilar service requests. For a unique request, it cannot detect corruption.
– If a service requester’s and provider’s familiarity to each other are known, does
it promote corruption? Answer: The ANIT I model can represent actor inter-
relationships and thus can detect conflict-of-interest. However, it will only be able
to detect corruption if discrepancy is seen among outcome for similar service re-
quests.
– If a service request was found to be handled in a corrupt manner, can the culpability
of agents involved be established legally? Answer: If provenance information on
service provider’s side is maintained, all responsible actors can be determined. The
legal ramifications are unknown.
– Does allowing brokers to mediate service requests on behalf of service requesters
promote corruption? Answer: The impact of brokers in corruption can be detected
by comparing outcomes of similar service requests with and without brokers. To
understand the role of brokers, modeling of their relationships with actors in service
delivery is needed which the model allows.
The questions were not exhaustive but an initial formalization of the corruption
domain helps answer some of them.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we painted a vision of how ICT in general and agent technologies in par-
ticular can help tackle corruption in public services and identifed challenges to achieve
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the vision. We illustrated the vision using the common public process of national reg-
isteration of citizens seen around the world. Although some work is seen in detecting
corruptions, a lot more needs to be done to formalize, detect, address and ultimately
prevent corruption.
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